Economic Weapons of the West: A Review of Asymmetrical Import Dependency

Over the course of two months, the National Security Policy Center’s 2026 summer intern cohort conducted research on critical national security issues on behalf of the internship’s sponsor, UVA’s National Security Data and Policy Institute (NSDPI). The group’s work culminated in individual white papers on topics approved by NSDPI supervisors. Undergraduate researcher Owen Leshner’s white paper, “Economic Weapons of the West: A Review of Asymmetrical Import Dependency,” evaluates the resources available to Western nations seeking to counterbalance China’s ability to unilaterally impose economic hardships in pursuit of political objectives.

Executive Summary

Decorative Image Instances of economic coercion have risen to prominence in the past decade. The Iranian regime’s current effort to control oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz is the most pressing example. Western engagement with economic coercion intensified following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, during which Russia sought to restrict European access to its energy exports to pressure the European Union into adopting weaker posture. Both Russia and Iran employ economic coercion in clear and effective ways. However, a third world power poses the most prominent threat in this domain: China. Unlike Russia and Iran, China does not have a history of overt economic coercion, rather adopting a more strategically ambiguous approach. The consequences of these actions, combined with the absence of a coordinated Western response, indicate that without substantial improvements in economic policy coordination among transatlantic nations, China remains well-positioned to impose considerable economic harm.

The central issue is asymmetrical dependency. Over the past two decades, Western nations have increased their reliance on Chinese imports, while China has systematically reduced its dependence on Western commodities. By 2022, the United States, European Union, and Japan accounted for only 35 percent of the total value of Chinese trade dependencies, a significant decline from 73 percent in 2001. Conversely, the United States and European Union have deepened their dependence on Chinese goods.iv China has recognized this imbalance and, in several notable cases, has leveraged it to pursue its political objectives. The Council on Foreign Relations provides a comprehensive list of such incidents, but they generally reflect China’s expression of displeasure toward specific nations. For example, in 2021, Lithuania permitted the Taiwanese embassy to operate under the name “Taiwan” rather than “Taipei.” In retaliation, China reduced exports from Lithuania by 80 percent.vii A similar event occurred in 2021 when Australia called for an inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, prompting Chinese economic restrictions. In both cases, the economic consequences were largely unilateral, and the international response, particularly from the transatlantic community, was at best limited.

These cases demonstrate a single sided vulnerability in need of amelioration. To this end, the following question must be answered: If China can unilaterally impose economic hardship, what resources might Western nations withhold to induce a comparable degree of suffering?

Economic Weapons of the West: A Review of Asymmetrical Import Dependency

Executive Summary

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