Ceasefire as Subsidy:

Armed-Group Consolidation Under Colombia’s Total Peace

 

Charles Burns

July 15, 2026

 

Over the course of two months, the National Security Policy Center’s 2026 summer intern cohort conducted research on critical national security issues on behalf of UVA’s National Security Data and Policy Institute (NSDPI). The group’s work culminated in individual white papers on topics approved by NSDPI supervisors. Graduate researcher Charles Burns’ white paper, “Ceasefire as Subsidy: Armed-Group Consolidation Under Colombia’s Total Peace,” provides an analysis of Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace policy.

Decorative Image for Internship white paper Colombia Total PeaceExecutive Summary

With the inauguration of Colombia’s first leftist president in 2022, the government of Gustavo Petro swiftly embarked on a peacemaking initiative dubbed Total Peace. Under the policy, armed groups were engaged through a negotiating strategy of mutual legitimacy that largely eschewed the military-led approaches of previous administrations. While the policy yielded genuine successes in reducing violence, it also lent armed networks a degree of operational security that enabled their continued growth across much of the country. With Petro soon ceding power to a right-wing populist who has disavowed the policy, Total Peace is worth studying for its successes as much as its drawbacks. In particular, three findings stand out.

● Ultimately, violent conflict with state actors declined. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data identified a 28% reduction in violent events involving security forces coming into conflict with armed groups during Petro’s first 27 months in office, with an 11% reduction in overall fatalities from armed-group violence compared to the period before his inauguration. However, the decline was concentrated in conflicts with security forces as opposed to overall violence.

● Ceasefires were unconditioned, which rendered them exploitable. The bilateral ceasefires were launched without verification protocols or restrictions on recruitment to expand ranks. Armed groups gained operational initiative, at almost no cost to them.

● Armed groups used the ceasefires to consolidate, deepening their organizational power. Membership across Colombia’s armed groups grew by more than 5,000 in 2025 alone, exceeding 27,000. In spite of the state’s military operations belatedly resuming, groups expanded their control over illicit revenue streams. Inter-group confrontation rose to its highest levels in a decade, as factions competed over the spoils.

The policy was not uniformly a failure, as its one disarmament process emerged from regional talks that possessed the structural features the national ceasefires lacked. For U.S. policymakers weighing engagement with Colombia’s incoming government, the lesson is not that negotiation fails. Negotiation strategies hold promise in reducing violent conflict, but the structural details matter. In effect, ceasefires that concede operational security without verification or conditions function as a subsidy to the groups they are meant to demobilize.

Research Placemat:

Ceasefire as Subsidy: Armed-Group Consolidation in Colombia

 

White Paper:

Ceasefire as Subsidy: Armed-Group Consolidation Under Colombia’s Total Peace